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In the winter of 2001, Tyron Alexander and Kevin Carrol 
were being held in a jail awaiting appearance in court when 
they were involved in a fight with two prison guards. 
Apparently no one was seriously injured, but Alexander 
and Carrol were placed in an isolation cell.1 Aptly named 
“the hole,” the cell, a “sparse” 64-square-foot space meant 
to contain only one person, held no running water and no 
toilet.2 At first both Alexander and Carrol were stripped of 
their clothing and were naked. Later they were given boxer 
shorts but no other clothing to wear. Instead of a toilet the 
cell had a grate-covered hole in the floor that could only be 
flushed by prison officials outside the cell. Carroll became 
nauseated soon after being confined in the cell and was 
forced to defecate into the drain, after which he was 
allowed only one sheet of toilet paper for cleaning purposes. 
Afterwards, the drain became obstructed with feces. Alex-
ander and Carrol tried to clear the obstruction but were not 
successful. No one helped them. When they had to urinate, 
urine splattered from the clogged drain onto the cell floor. 
The smell nauseated Carrol who then vomited into the 
drain. When the guards finally decided to do something 
they were unable to flush the drain. Nevertheless, rather 
than release Carroll and Alexander from the contaminated 
cell, the guards kept them confined. The guards then 
instructed an inmate trusty to spray water into the cell 
through an opening at the bottom of the cell door. But this 
was a failure which only served to further spread the waste 
across the floor. Desperate, Carroll and Alexander requested 
a mop to clean the mess. The request was denied, and they 
remained confined in the stench of the dirty, contaminated 
isolation cell. Because they were not let out of the cell and 
because it had no running water, Carroll and Alexander 
could not wash their hands. When it came time to eat, they 
were not given utensils. In this urine-, feces-, and vomit-
infested cell prison officials served Carroll and Alexander 
lunch and dinner. There was no bed but instead a concrete 
protrusion from the wall with space for just one person. No 
mattress or sheets or blankets were provided even though 
the men were clothed only in boxer shorts on that winter 
evening. That night in the cold they tried to sleep by shar-
ing the small concrete slab.
After they were released Alexander and Carroll sued for 
violations of their constitutional rights. Crediting all these 
facts as true for the purposes of its decision,3 both the trial 
court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 
case must be dismissed nevertheless because of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act’s prohibition on suits that do not 
involve physical injury.4
Steven Jarriett’s case was dismissed by the Sixth Cir-
cuit for the same reason.5 In 2006 Jarriett was involved in 
a fight with another inmate. He was sent to the prison’s 
segregation unit where he was placed for over thirteen 
hours in a “strip cage,” a tiny two-and-a-half-feet square 
enclosure with so little room that it was impossible to 
recline and difficult to even sit. This was excruciatingly 
painful for Jarriett, who had an injured leg. After his 
release, he, too, brought suit. However, he lost for the 
same reason as Alexander and Carroll: there was no physi-
cal injury involved in his suffering, and so his case was 
barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act.6
A third case involving Essam Mohammed Jameel 
Najeed Adnan met a parallel fate.7 Mr. Adnan, for no 
apparent reason other than the fact that he is an Arab 
American, was placed in solitary confinement for more 
than three months where he was shackled at his arms and 
legs and let out of his cell for only three hours a week 
although he had no violent history and had been classified 
as a minimum security risk. These conditions had an 
intense effect on Mr. Adnan. Following his release, he was 
required to take three different anti-depressants. Prior to 
this episode he had no history of mental illness. When 
Mr. Adnan sued, the court held that he had presented a 
valid claim for a violation of his constitutional rights, but 
he was denied compensatory damages because he was not 
physically injured during his stay in segregation.8
What these cases have in common is that each deals 
with conditions in a solitary confinement or isolation or 
segregation unit in a modern American penal institution. 
What goes on in these units, which have dramatically 
increased in number over the last thirty years, has enor-
mous significance and has attracted the concerned 
attention of national and international groups.9 These 
cases also illustrate that the threat of abuse in these units is 
quite high. Finally, what these cases have in common is 
that in each the PLRA’s physical injury requirement was 
invoked to terminate the plaintiff’s claim for compensatory 
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damages. This is an intolerable result for a country that 
prides itself on its embrace of the rule of law.
This article addresses this problem and calls for changes 
that would remove the shackle of the PLRA’s physical 
injury requirement, which prevents federal courts from 
vindicating the rights of persons who are subjected to 
unconstitutional treatment in isolation units in America.  
The article has three parts. Part I provides a brief history 
of the use of solitary confinement in the United States, 
describes the current use of solitary, and outlines the dan-
gers to human rights that are posed by the operation of 
isolation and solitary confinement units. Part II describes 
how the physical injury requirement of the PLRA, as cur-
rently interpreted by a majority of the courts, prevents 
inmates from vindicating their rights. Part III is a call for 
repeal or reform of the physical injury requirement. It 
urges Congress to repeal the provision and provides rea-
sons why it should do so. It also argues that, if the law 
stays on the books, the courts should interpret this provi-
sion in a manner that is more faithful to the legislative 
history of the PLRA, and in a manner that permits courts 
to offer meaningful remedies for serious conditions 
impacting inmates in solitary confinement units.
I.  Isolation and Solitary Confinement in the  
United States
The increased use of solitary confinement—or the isola-
tion of a prisoner from other inmates and most social 
contact—is one of the most pressing issues in American 
corrections. The use of isolation has grown dramatically in 
recent years.10 Currently, unprecedented numbers of 
inmates are being held in isolation, solitary confinement, 
or supermax units, as they are variously known. While the 
numbers are greater than ever before, solitary confine-
ment is not a new development. Indeed, this country was 
the first to make solitary an institutionalized part of the 
normal operation of its prisons. One might even say that 
solitary as we know it was invented here.11 When the first 
modern prisons were established, with the advent of the 
Pennsylvania penitentiary system early in this history of 
this country, solitary confinement was chosen as the 
method best designed to lead to reformation of crimi-
nals.12 The theory was that a prisoner left alone in his cell, 
isolated from harmful outside influences, would become 
penitent through reflection upon his sins.13 However, it 
soon became apparent that rather than becoming rehabili-
tated, prisoners kept under such conditions were actually 
deteriorating mentally and had higher death rates than 
other prisoners.14 Charles Dickens, perhaps the most 
famous visitor to American prisons at that time, was 
appalled by the impact of solitary on human beings. Call-
ing solitary “a dreadful punishment” which inflicts an 
“immense amount of torture and agony . . . which no man 
has a right to inflict upon his fellow-creature,” Dickens 
concluded, “I hold this slow and daily tampering with the 
mysteries of the brain, to be immeasurably worse than any 
torture of the body . . . .”15
Because of this failed experiment, solitary confinement 
was rarely used and fell out of disfavor in the United 
States.16 However, over the last thirty years, with the dra-
matic rise in prison populations, solitary confinement has 
been rediscovered. Some trace the modern use of solitary 
to its reinstatement at the federal prison in Marion, Illi-
nois, following a prison riot in 1983.17 The supposed 
success of that use at Marion sparked others to establish 
their own solitary, isolation, or supermax facilities,18 and 
the use of solitary has grown since then.19 While the 
Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics does 
not offer statistics regarding the number of people in soli-
tary,20 as of 2004 at least 25,000 prisoners were housed in 
so-called “supermax” prisons where all prisoners are kept 
in isolation.21 In addition, at least another 50,000 to 
80,000—perhaps more—prisoners are in segregated 
units in other prisons and jails.22
Conditions vary, but many isolated prisoners typically 
spend between twenty-two and twenty-three hours per day 
in cells that can be as small as six feet by eight feet.23 Pris-
oners typically are let out for only a few hours a week for 
showers and exercise, are strictly limited as to what per-
sonal items or reading material they may retain, and are 
often kept in windowless rooms that are in some units lit 
twenty-four hours a day with fluorescent lighting, making 
it difficult for the prisoner to even know if it is night or 
day.24 Even time spent out of their cells is often time spent 
alone, and prisoners are normally forbidden to talk to each 
other through their cell walls.25 Prisoners may also be pro-
hibited from having radios, televisions, or most forms of 
reading materials.26 It is not surprising, therefore, that 
when kept under these conditions for long periods of 
time, prisoners may experience a number of psychological 
problems and mental illnesses, including self-mutilation, 
anxiety, panic disorder, difficulty in thinking and remem-
bering, suicidal tendencies, depression, and impulse 
control problems.27 Prisoners already suffering from men-
tal illness before being placed in solitary fare even worse.28
Providing modern scientific support to the observa-
tions of Charles Dickens regarding the torturous nature of 
this type of confinement, studies have demonstrated that 
such isolation can have ruinous effects on individuals.29 
One observer, for example, reported that 50 percent of 
inmates who commit suicide are found within the 2 to 8 
percent of those inmates housed in solitary.30
In addition, isolation units create an environment in 
which additional abuses can and do occur.31 One need look 
no further than the cases identified at the beginning of this 
article for evidence that isolation/solitary confinement 
units provide fertile soil for mistreatment and abuses of 
prisoners. The treatment that Alexander and Carroll 
received in the filthy strip cell and the suffering Jarriett 
experienced in his small strip cage, and the prolonged, 
unnecessary isolation to which Adnan was subjected are all 
typical examples of the kinds of abuses that occur in soli-
tary confinement units.32 As one observer put it, “Because 
of the absence of witnesses, solitary confinement increases 
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the risk of acts of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment.”33
Solitary confinement, as practiced in the United States, 
has drawn the attention of observers both here in the 
United States and abroad. On the national scale, one 
example is the National Commission on Safety and Abuse 
in American Prisons, which, in a comprehensive report on 
conditions in American prisons, concluded that solitary 
confinement should only be used as “a last resort.”34 The 
report also recommended that prison systems be much 
more careful about using solitary for inmates whose con-
duct did not justify it, and that even for situations where 
solitary was needed that steps be taken to lessen the sever-
ity of the isolation by giving “prisoners in segregation 
opportunities to fully engage in treatment, work, study, 
and other productive activities, and to feel part of a com-
munity.”35 The Commission urged that prisoners with a 
mental illness that would make them particularly vulnera-
ble to conditions in segregation be housed in secure 
therapeutic units rather than in solitary confinement.36
America’s use of solitary has also caused international 
attention. For example, the Committee Against Torture, 
the official body established to monitor compliance with 
the International Convention Against Torture, a treaty rati-
fied by the United States,37 expressed concern about the 
severe isolation in America’s “supermaximum prisons.”38 
In August 2011 the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur of 
the Human Rights Council, in a report to the General 
Assembly of the UN on torture and other cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment or punishment, pointing to exten-
sive use of solitary confinement in the United States 
found that prolonged solitary confinement, which it 
defined as isolation for more than 15 days, violates the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.39
Despite all this concern, courts in this country have 
been handicapped in their ability to fully address condi-
tions in solitary confinement units in American prisons 
because of numerous provisions in the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act.40 One such provision is the physical injury 
requirement to which we now turn.
II. The Physical Injury Requirement
Despite the clear and present danger of abuse presented 
by the extensive use of solitary confinement in the United 
States, the physical injury requirement of the Prison 
Reform Litigation Act, as currently interpreted, erects a 
formidable barrier for persons who seek compensation 
and vindication for the abuses that they have suffered in 
solitary. That section provides, as a limitation on recovery, 
that no prisoner may bring a federal civil action “for men-
tal or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a 
prior showing of physical injury.”41 The majority of courts 
have chosen to construe this provision to require actual 
non–de minimis physical harm before they will even enter-
tain a lawsuit for damages for abuses.42 Thus, “complaints 
of exposure to unconstitutional prison living conditions”—
those that deny the “minimal civilized measure of life 
necessities”—without physical injury are considered to be 
claims of mental or emotional injury for which compensa-
tory damages are barred.43
The effect of this interpretation is that shocking cases 
for damages for abuses in solitary confinement units are 
dismissed without so much as a hearing. In the soiled 
unsanitary strip cell in which they were confined, Alexan-
der and Carroll suffered through a ghastly experience, but 
because of the physical injury provision of the PLRA the 
case ended. Jarriett was not just isolated for thirteen 
hours; he was confined in a space too small for him to 
even sit without “balling” himself up, much less lie 
down.44 While he alleged that he had a bad leg and thus 
experienced severe pain, the court found no physical 
injury and so his claims for compensatory damages was 
dismissed because of the physical injury provision.45 
Finally, Adnan was held in absolute isolation and shack-
led without any justification, but here, too, the conditions 
did not cause physical injury so his claim for compensa-
tory damages was undermined by the PLRA.46 These 
cases illustrate that the PLRA, with its physical injury 
requirement, makes the assertion of a valid claim for 
compensatory damages extraordinarily difficult, if not 
impossible. Even when an inmate can claim some physi-
cal injury, courts will often term the injury de minimis and 
dismiss the claim for damages.47 Courts in these situa-
tions have allowed for injunctions in cases in which there 
is a need for equitable relief to enjoin further abuse.48 
However, injunctions are often not available, and even 
when they are they do not compensate for past harm.49 
The most that is available under the majority view for 
inmates who have been abused in solitary confinement 
but did not suffer physical injury, and at the time the law-
suit is brought are not seeking injunctive relief,50 is 
nominal damages and the possibility, remote though it is, 
of punitive damages.51
III.  A Call for Repeal or Reform of the Physical Injury 
Requirement
The physical injury requirement, as interpreted by the 
majority of courts, is an affront to the rule of law. With it, 
conditions that would shock the conscience of American 
sensibility are insulated from judicial review and go 
unremedied. This would be a bad result in any setting, but 
in the prison field where the lack of oversight is so glaring, 
and the need for oversight so necessary,52 this is even 
more intolerable. There are two solutions to this problem. 
One is that Congress should repeal the physical injury 
requirement. The other is that federal courts should inter-
pret the provision to allow suits to correct abuses such as 
those described in this article.
A.  Congress Should Repeal the Physical Injury 
Requirement
There is nothing in the legislative history of the PLRA that 
justifies the physical injury requirement. As we have seen, 
it interdicts otherwise valid constitutional claims. But there 
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thus are not barred by the physical injury provision. Cur-
rently a majority of the courts have not followed this path. 
They have read the physical injury provision of the PLRA to 
bar any constitutional claim for compensatory damages that 
an inmate asserts, no matter how valid it may be, if the vio-
lation of constitutional rights did not produce a physical 
injury.66 This interpretation overlooks that constitutional 
claims by inmates who are abused in solitary confinement 
typically are claims which by their nature do not require 
physical injury as an essential element of the claim. Eighth 
Amendment claims for cruel and unusual punishment, for 
example, are based on a finding of the objective seriousness 
of the conditions to which an inmate is exposed. If these 
conditions fall below “the minimal civilized measure of 
life’s necessities,”67 or if they fail to meet the “identifiable 
human need[s]” of inmates68and if they are imposed with 
deliberate indifference69 to these objective needs, then there 
is a constitutional violation according to decisions of the 
Supreme Court, regardless of whether the conditions cause 
physical injury. The basic protection of the Eighth Amend-
ment, in other words, is not against just physical injury; 
rather, it is protection against profound affronts to human 
dignity.70 One need look no further than the abuses that 
were inflicted on inmates at the notorious Abu Ghraib 
prison to appreciate that cruel and inhuman punishment 
can be inflicted without the necessity of proving actual 
physical injury.71 The same is true for procedural due pro-
cess violations that occur when inmates are subjected to 
indefinite confinement in solitary confinement units with-
out meaningful review.72 The injury that is protected 
against here is the injury to liberty, which, of course, can 
occur without regard to whether there is physical injury. 
The majority interpretation of the PLRA thus cuts off 
claims for compensatory damages for violations of this fun-
damental constitutional right. This, in the words of one 
commentator, “[n]ot only . . . leave[s] the prisoner without 
the ability to invoke the judicial power to protect his funda-
mental rights, but it also sends a powerful message to 
prison authorities that they may engage in constitutional 
wrongdoing without fear of judicial penalty.”73
A few courts have rejected this narrow approach, hold-
ing that the PLRA was not meant to bar constitutional 
claims. A good example is Robinson v. Page,74 in which 
Judge Richard Posner held that an Eighth Amendment 
claim for exposure to asbestos unaccompanied by a claim 
of physical injury is not barred by the PLRA. Judge Posner 
observed that “[i]t would be a serious mistake to interpret 
section 1997e(e) to require a showing of physical injury in 
all prisoner civil rights suits.”75 This interpretation is more 
in accord with the legislative history of the PLRA,76 more 
in line with tort doctrine,77 and more respectful of the 
essential role of the federal courts in our constitutional sys-
tem of governance.78 It should be adopted by the courts.
IV. Conclusion
The physical injury provision of the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act, as interpreted by the majority of the courts, 
is no evidence that Congress actually intended to prohibit 
“legitimate constitutional claims simply because the pris-
oner suffered no physical injury.”53 Rather, the legislative 
history of the act, sparse though it is,54 demonstrates 
clearly that what was on Congress members’ minds was 
imposing some realistic checks on frivolous lawsuits by 
prisoners who had nothing but time on their hands and 
who used these suits as a way of distracting themselves 
from the tedium of prison life,55 while draining public 
resources needed to defend the lawsuits56 and diverting the 
attention of prison administrators that could be spent on 
better things. These concerns were not completely base-
less. In 1993, a few years before the PLRA was enacted, 
prison cases were a little over 40 percent of the appeals 
filed in federal courts.57 Prison cases had also increased 
dramatically in the district courts.58 Many members of 
Congress believed that some of these suits, the overwhelm-
ing majority of which were filed and prosecuted pro se 
without the benefit of counsel, were frivolous.59 Senators 
took the floor in support of the PLRA decrying lawsuits 
that were filed in response to “almost any perceived slight 
or inconvenience”60 such as those involving claims over 
bad haircuts, inadequate locker space, and “being served 
‘hacked up’ cake.”61 In their zeal to weed out perceived friv-
olous lawsuits, however, Senators avowed that it was not 
their intent to discourage prisoners from bringing “legiti-
mate” and “meritorious” claims.62 One Senator, for 
instance, guaranteed that the PLRA “will allow meritorious 
claims to be filed.”63 In the words of one commentator who 
reviewed the legislative history of the PLRA, “Senators 
repeatedly claimed that the PLRA would not prevent legiti-
mate constitutional claims from being litigated and 
redressed.”64 With this background it is difficult to under-
stand what Congress had in mind when it included the 
physical injury component in the PLRA. Regardless, in 
light of the overwhelming evidence that (1) the drafters of 
the PLRA had no intent to close the courthouse doors to 
legitimate meritorious cases, and (2) the physical injury 
requirement of the PLRA, as currently interpreted by 
courts, has had just that effect, there is nothing to lose and 
everything to gain by repealing this provision of the PLRA.
B.  Courts Should Interpret the Physical Injury 
Provision in a Manner that Restores the Ability 
of Courts to Remedy Constitutional Abuses in 
Solitary Confinement Units
While repeal of the physical injury provision of the PLRA is 
the cleanest solution, there is another method to provide 
judicial oversight to address abuses in solitary confinement: 
federal courts should construe the vague physical injury 
provision65 not to exclude constitutional claims for compen-
sation for abuses in solitary confinement units. Put another 
way, claims for cruel and unusual punishment and proce-
dural due process violations in solitary confinement units 
such as those described in this article should be regarded as 
constitutional claims that do not depend for their violation 
on a finding of physical, emotional, or mental injury and 
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ordeal better were not generally reformed, and in most cases 
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quent service to the community.”); davenport v. derobertis, 
844 F.2d 1310, 1316 (7th cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 
908 (1988) (noting the wealth of  literature concerning the det-
rimental effects of  solitary confinement); Madrid v. gomez, 
889 F. Supp. 1146, 1230–31 (n.d. cal. 1995) (noting clinical 
and scientific findings that human beings subjected to isola-
tion may “deteriorate mentally and in some cases develop 
psychiatric disturbances.”).
 16 Hresko, supra note 14, at 7. 
 17 Id. 
 18 after the establishment of  the isolation facility in Marion, 
other states followed suit, with between thirty and thirty-four 
constructing similar facilities by 1999. lena Kurki & norval 
Morris, The Purposes, Practices and Problems of  Supermax 
Prisons, in 28 Crime and JustiCe, a review of researCh 385, 
385 (Michael tonry ed., 2001), available at https://www.
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/digitization/192542-192549ncJrS.pdf; 
see also daniel p. Mears & Michael d. reisig, The Theory and 
Practice of  Supermax Prisons, 8 Punishment & soC’y 33, 33 
(2005), available at http://pun.sagepub.com/content/8/1/33.
full.pdf+html.
 19 Hresko, supra note 14, at 7–8. 
 20 n.y.C. Bar ass’n Comm. on int’l human rights, the Brutality of 
suPermax Confinement 9 (2011).
 21 arrigo & Bullock, supra note 13, at 624. Supermax prisons 
have been defined by the national institute of  corrections as 
restrictive housing units where violent or escape-prone pris-
oners, or those who might instigate disturbances, are 
isolated from each other as well as the general prison popula-
tion. However, this definition can hide the fact that 
assignment to supermax prisons is generally long-term with 
prison officials wielding great discretion over what may be 
considered a sufficient security risk, and that often supermax 
facilities include almost total isolation with prisoners spend-
ing approximately twenty-three hours a day in windowless 
cells. Some facilities limit any personal interaction even 
between inmates and staff. Kurki & Morris, supra note 18, at 
388–90; see also craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-
Term Solitary and “Supermax” Confinement, 49 Crime & 
delinquenCy 124, 125–127 (2003).
 22 atul gawande, Hellhole, new yorker, Mar. 30, 2009, at 36, 
available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/ 
03/30/090330fa_fact_gawande. Support for the use of  
supermax prisons focuses on the idea that isolating the most 
dangerous inmates from the general prison population will 
contribute to prison security, protect other inmates and 
prison staff, and deter other prisoners from misconduct. 
However, arguments exist, based on general deterrent 
research, that housing prisoners in supermax prisons may 
not even fulfill the supposed function of  maximizing prison 
security. the threat of  placement in a supermax facility may 
offer little deterrence to prisoners as such decisions are often 
administrative and based on reasons over which prisoners 
have little control. it is possible that supermax prisons actu-
ally contribute to less prison security because those released 
from supermax into the general prison population may be so 
filled with rage that they are more prone to violence towards 
other inmates and prison staff. See, e.g., Jesenia pizzaro & 
Vanja M.K. Stenius, Supermax Prisons: Their Rise, Current 
Practices, and Effects on Inmates, 84 Prison J. 248, 261 
(2004); see also Jeffrey Smith Mcloeod, Anxiety, Despair, and 
the Maddening Isolation of  Solitary Confinement: Invoking the 
First Amendment’s Protection Against State Action That Invades 
the Sphere of  the Intellect and Spirit, 70 u. Pitt. l. rev. 647, 
657 (2009) (noting that solitary can contribute to low 
impulse control in prisoners and keeping prisoners in solitary 
creates a barrier between the Constitution and solitary 
confinement and isolation units in American prisons. 
This is inconsistent with the rule of law and the admoni-
tion of the Supreme Court that there “is no iron curtain 
drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this 
country.”79 It, therefore, should be abolished either 
through legislation or through judicial interpretation.
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prisoners in segregation was 40 percent as opposed to a 28 
percent growth rate for the number of  prisoners in the overall 
prison population. Comm’n on safety & aBuse in ameriCa’s 
Prisons, supra note 9, at 53.
 11 See, e.g., miChael B. mushlin, rights of Prisoners § 1.2 (4th 
ed. 2011) (describing the history of  the american prison sys-
tem and its early prisons “marked by isolation [and] silence”).
 12 Stuart grassian, Psychiatric Effects of  Solitary Confinement, 22 
wash. J.l. & Pol’y 325, 328 (2006).
 13 See Bruce a. arrigo & Jennifer leslie Bullock, The Psychological 
Effects of  Solitary Confinement on Prisoners in Supermax Units: 
Reviewing What We Know and Recommending What Should 
Change, 52 int’l J. offender theraPy & ComP. Criminology 622, 
623 (2008); elizabeth Vasiliades, Solitary Confinement and 
International Human Rights: Why the U.S. Prison System Fails 
Global Standards, 21 am. u. int’l l. rev. 71, 73 (2005).
 14 tracy Hresko, In the Cellars of  the Hollow Men: Use of  Solitary 
Confinement in U.S. Prisons and Its Implications under Interna-
tional Laws Against Torture, 18 PaCe int’l l. rev. 1, 6 (2006).
 15 Charles diCkens, ameriCan notes 146 (Fromm int’l 1985) 
(1842), cited in Jules lobel, Prolonged Solitary Confinement and 
the Constitution, 11 u. Pa. J. Const. l. 115, 118 (2008). See 
also in re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890) (“a considerable 
number of  the prisoners fell, after even a short confinement, 
into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to impos-
sible to arouse them, and others became violently insane; 
others still, committed suicide; while those who stood the 
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study found that mentally ill prisoners in administrative segre-
gation did not deteriorate at a rate greater than non-mentally 
ill prisoners, and that while those prisoners in segregation did 
have higher psychological markers than “normative adult 
samples,” this was true for the control group in the general 
prison population as well. Id. the study also found an initial 
improvement in all prisoners’ psychological well-being during 
the first interval of  testing. Id. at viii. 
   there has been criticism of  the colorado study, including 
that it ignored suicide crisis amongst prisoners that took 
place during the study’s analysis, and that it only accepted 
those prisoners who could read and write at an eighth-grade 
level. Stuart grassian & terry Kupers, The Colorado Study v. 
The Reality of  Supermax, 13 Corr. mental health reP. 1, 9 
(2011). illiteracy is one of  the factors correlated with psychi-
atric deterioration in solitary. Furthermore, the fact that only 
those prisoners willing to volunteer for the study were looked 
at means that those prisoners excluded may have been those 
more likely to suffer detrimental effects. in addition, the colo-
rado study may not be indicative of  the conditions in other 
solitary units; the facility in colorado had windows in the 
walls where inmates could see outside. there were also win-
dows in the doors through which they could see each other 
and use sign language to communicate, and the inmates also 
had access to educational programs, televisions, and radios, 
as well as reading material, art materials, and games. Jamie 
Fellner, What Should We Think About the Study on the Psycho-
logical Impact of  Confinement at Colorado State Penitentiary? A 
Human Rights Perspective, 13 Corr. mental health reP. 5, 5 
(2011). While studies of  inmates involuntarily housed in soli-
tary also suffer from limitations such as the failure to look at 
inmates’ mental health prior to their time in solitary, the 
majority of  research does point to the fact that solitary con-
finement has a harmful effect on prisoners. pizzaro & 
Stenius, supra note 22, at 257. these studies are supported 
by research and observations on the effects of  isolation. See 
generally grassian, supra note 12, at 344–45 (mentioning the 
effects of  solitary on prisoners of  war and studies concerning 
the effects of  sensory deprivation); gawande, supra note 22 
(discussing the effects of  isolation on prisoners of  war and 
hostages, and detrimental effects of  isolation on individuals, 
other than inmates, who have been held in similar situations).
 30 grassian & Kupers, supra note 29, at 9.
 31 See e.g., Kurki & Morris, supra note 18, at 409; Special rap-
porteur of  the Human rights council, supra note 9, at 19 
(“Because of  the absence of  witnesses, solitary confinement 
increases the risk of  facts of  torture and other cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment.”); Comm’n on 
safety & aBuse in ameriCa’s Prisons, supra note 9, at 14 
(“there is troubling evidence that the distress of  living and 
working in this environment actually causes violence between 
staff  and prisoner.”).
 32 See alexander v. tippah cnty., Miss., 351 F.3d 626 (5th cir. 
2003); Jarriett v. Wilson, 162 F. app’x 394 (6th cir. 2005); 
adnan v. Santa clara cnty. dep’t of  corr., no. 4:02–cV–03451, 
c 02–3451 cW (pr), 2002 Wl 32058464, at *2 (n.d. cal. 
aug. 15, 2002).
 33 Special rapporteur of  the Human rights council, supra note 
9, at 19.
 34 Comm’n on safety & aBuse in ameriCa’s Prisons, supra note 9, 
at 53. 
 35 Id. at 56.
 36 Id. at 59. the american Bar association, after a five-year 
drafting process, in 2010 approved a set of  minimum stan-
dards that also called for significant changes. among these 
are appropriate procedures prior to placing a prisoner in 
solitary, limiting the duration of  solitary, decreasing 
extreme isolation, close mental health monitoring for people 
can actually lessen community safety when they are 
released.).
 23 arrigo & Bullock, supra note 13, at 624. 
 24 Id. at 625. 
 25 Hresko, supra note 14, at 8. 
 26 Id. at 9. these kinds of  restrictions were upheld by the 
United States Supreme court in Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 
(2006). an indication of  the impact this kind of  treatment 
can have is that in at least one case, when a prisoner was 
finally given a television, he began to hear voices emanating 
from it that he thought were speaking directly to him. gawa-
nde, supra note 22.
 27 arrigo & Bullock, supra note 13, at 628.
 28 See Madrid v. gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1216 (n.d. cal. 
1995) (noting expert testimony that inmates with existing 
mental health issues “are at a higher risk of  deteriorating in 
the SHU.”). See generally grassian, supra note 12 (indicating 
that general medical literature points to the fact that individu-
als with underlying mental vulnerabilities fare worse in 
isolating situations than those with healthy mental function-
ing; among other studies and observations, the article relates 
a story of  female prisoners with histories of  mental illness 
who were placed in isolation, resulting in a nightmarish situa-
tion where “many became grossly disorganized and psychotic, 
smearing themselves with feces, mumbling and screaming 
incoherently all day and night, some even descending to the 
horror of  eating parts of  their own bodies.”).
 29 Hresko, supra note 14, at 11. observation of  the impact of  
isolation on individuals comes from a variety of  sources: for 
example, the experience of  prisoners of  war and hostages. 
Studies regarding the effects of  isolation on baby monkeys 
showed that they were unable to function when placed with 
normal monkeys and that “twelve months of  isolation almost 
obliterated the animals socially.” these studies were seen to 
be so cruel that they helped to start the animal rights move-
ment. gawande, supra note 22. 
   While most studies support the contention that solitary con-
finement is detrimental to inmates’ mental and physical health, 
there does appear to be a correlation between the length and 
conditions of  confinement and the detrimental effects and it 
has not yet been proven that short-term solitary confinement 
has the same severe consequences as long-term confinement. 
arrigo & Bullock, supra note 13, at 627. in addition, there are a 
few studies that have contradicted the findings that individuals 
in solitary suffer severe consequences. 
   two studies have found that limited solitary confinement 
did contribute to better inmate behavior and, surprisingly, to 
better inmate outlook and optimism. See p. Suedfeld & c. roy, 
Using Social Isolation to Change the Behavior of  Disruptive 
Inmates, 19 J. offender theraPy & ComP. Criminology 90 
(1975); p. Suedfeld, Reactions and Attributes of  Prisoners in 
Solitary Confinement, 9 Crim. J. & Behav. 303 (1982). However, 
it is important to note that one of  these studies involved only 
four inmates who were in solitary for no more than thirty 
days, and the other involved only prisoners who had volun-
teered to take part in the study in simulated isolation units. 
Such conditions are not indicative of  outcomes in real-life sit-
uations, given that prisoners in solitary do not volunteer for 
the isolation and are often there for much longer than thirty 
days. pizzaro & Stenius, supra note 22, at 257. there is also a 
recent study that focused on colorado inmates in administra-
tive segregation and purported to bring an empirical analysis 
to the issue through a systematic study of  the effects of  soli-
tary on prisoners, both with and without previous mental 
illnesses, as well as comparison with a control group of  pris-
oners in the general population. maureen l. o’keefe et al., one 
year longitudinal study of the PsyChologiCal effeCts of admin-
istrative segregation, at ii (2010). among other results, this 
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segregation unit “strip cage,” where he was forced to stand 
for more than thirteen hours, did not suffer more than a de 
minimis physical injury, despite fact he suffered from pain 
and severe swelling in his leg that had been previously injured 
in a motorcycle accident).
 48 despite the prohibition on compensatory claims for purely 
mental or emotional injury, courts have generally held that 
the plra allows for injunctive relief  even when no physical 
injury exists, including such relief  for mentally ill inmates 
who are placed in solitary. See royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 
720, 723 (8th cir. 2004); thompson v. carter, 284 F.3d 411, 
418 (2nd cir. 2002); davis v. district of  columbia, 158 F.3d 
1342, 1346 (d.c. cir. 1998) (agreeing with the district, and 
the United States as intervenor, that the plra allows claims 
for injunctive and declaratory relief  for emotional injury). See 
also Jones’el v. Berge, 164 F.2d 1096, 1123–24 (W.d. Wis. 
2001) (ordering injunctive relief  in the transfer of  some men-
tally ill prisoners from supermax, and the mental health 
evaluation of  certain others). in addition, some courts have 
gone so far as to allow claims for nominal or punitive damages 
in cases of  mental anguish. lobel, supra note 15, at 133–34.
 49 allison cohn, Can $1 Buy Constitutionality?: The Effect of  Nom-
inal and Punitive Damages on the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s 
Physical Injury Requirement, 8 u. Pa. J. Const. l. 299, 324 
(2006) (noting that the “availability of  punitive or nominal 
damages . . . seems to be more of  an exercise in dicta than 
reality.”).
 50 See Zehner v. trigg, 133 F.3d 459 (7th cir. 1997); see also 
mushlin, supra note 11, § 7.26. 
 51 See Williams v. Hobbs, nos. 10–2465, 10–2712, 2011 Wl 
6004086, at *10–11, *13 (8th cir. dec. 2, 2011) (reversing 
an award of  $1 in nominal damages for each day of  the 
almost ten years prisoner was in solitary and instead order-
ing that damages be no more than $1 for every sixty days in 
isolation); Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869 (10th cir. 
2001) (stating that “as a general rule, punitive damages may 
be recovered for constitutional violations” and noting the 
court’s belief  that congress did not intend to restrict punitive 
damages; court also noted that the government itself  has 
taken the position that punitive damages may be available as 
long as they are based purely on constitutional violations, 
rather than mental injury).
 52 See, e.g., Michele deitch & Michael B. Mushlin, Corrections: 
“Let the Sunshine In”: The ABA and Prison Oversight, state of 
Criminal JustiCe 2011, at 243 (am. Bar ass’n, crim. J. Sect., 
2011). 
 53 royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 730 (2004) (Heaney, J., dis-
senting) (looking at the legislative history of  42 U.S.c. 
1997e(e) in view of  a circuit split on whether the provision 
applied to First amendment claims and finding that little leg-
islative history exists as to this section of  the act).
 54 the plra received very little congressional attention before 
being passed, buried in an appropriations bill. as Senator 
Kennedy observed, the plra “was never the subject of  a 
committee mark-up, and there is no Judiciary committee 
report explaining the proposal. the plra was the subject of  
a single hearing in the Judiciary committee, hardly the type 
of  thorough review that a measure of  this scope deserves.” 
While some senators did voice strong objections regarding 
the plra’s effect on judges’ abilities to correct constitutional 
violations, the main concerns raised in the hearing and 
debate seemed to be centered its effect on courts’ abilities to 
“issue relief  in prison conditions cases” and consent decrees. 
See 142 Cong. reC. S2296–2300 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) 
(statement of  Sen. Kennedy & Sen. Simon). 
 55 cohn, supra note 49, at 304, n. 29; 141 Cong. reC. S14, 418 
(daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of  Sen. Kyl) (“today’s 
system seems to encourage prisoners to file with impunity. 
in solitary, and ending the solitary confinement of  the men-
tally ill. aBa standards, supra note 9. the relevant standards 
are Standard 23-2.5 through Standard 23-2.9 and Standard 
23-3.8. Full text of  the Standards is available at http://
www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_sec-
tion_archive/crimjust_standards_treatmentprisoners.html.
 37 U.n. convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, dec. 10, 1984, 1465 
U.n.t.S. 85. the United States ratified the treaty on october 
21, 1994. United nations treaty collection, Status of  the 
convention against torture, available at http://treaties.
un.org/pages/Viewdetails.aspx?src=treatY&mtdsg_no=iV-
9&chapter=4&lang=en.
 38 U.n. comm. against torture: conclusions and recommenda-
tions, supra note 9. 
 39 Special rapporteur of  the Human rights council, supra note 
9, at 23. the rapporteur, observing that even short-term soli-
tary confinement can amount to torture, id. at 20, concluded 
that because of  its torturous nature, “[t]he use of  solitary 
confinement can be accepted only in exceptional circum-
stances where its duration must be as short as possible and 
for a definite term that is properly announced and communi-
cated,” id. at 23. terms of  more than fifteen days should be 
prohibited. the report also warned of  the danger of  abuses 
of  prisoners above and beyond those inherent in isolation 
that occur when solitary confinement units are instituted. Id. 
at 19 (“Because of  the absence of  witnesses, solitary con-
finement increases the risk of  facts of  torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”).
 40 in addition to the physical injury requirement, other provi-
sions of  the plra—including the exhaustion requirement, the 
“three strikes” requirement, and limitations on attorney fees, 
to name just a few—have had a dramatic impact on access to 
courts for inmates. For a discussion of  these provisions see, 
for example, John Boston, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: 
The New Face Of  Court Stripping, 67 Brook l. rev. 429 (2001).
 41 42 U.S.c. 1997e(e) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 42 See, e.g., turner v. tezac, no. ciV.no. 02-145-KaJ, 2005 Wl 
41563 (d. del. Jan. 4, 2005) (holding that prisoner placed in 
SHU for fourteen days may not claim damages when he 
asserted only emotional injury; further, his time in SHU did 
not rise to the level of  atypical hardship and so he may not 
even claim for nominal damages); torres v. logan, no. 10 civ. 
6951(pac)(Jlc), 2011 Wl 1811003 (S.d.n.Y. May 11, 2011) 
(holding that prisoner’s claim for compensatory damages for 
time spent in central punitive Segregation Unit that left him 
depressed and in need of  mental health treatment failed 
when he did not claim physical injury); Harden-Bey v. rutter, 
524 F3d 789 (6th cir. 2008) (even though inmate’s indefinite 
confinement in administrative segregation for three years and 
running constitutes an “atypical and significant hardship,” 
the inmate’s claims for emotional and mental injuries suf-
fered as a result of  his isolation were dismissed because he 
failed to show the physical injury required by the plra). See 
also mushlin, supra note 11, § 17.27 (collecting cases).
 43 John Boston & daniel e. manville, Prisoners’ self-helP litiga-
tion manual 622 (2011) (collecting cases).
 44 Jarriett v. Wilson, 162 F. app’x 394, 397 n.1 (6th cir. 2005). 
 45 Id. at 397, 401.
 46 adnan v. Santa clara cnty. dep’t of  corr., no. 4:02–cV–03451, 
c 02–3451 cW (pr), 2002 Wl 32058464, at *3 (n.d. cal. 
aug. 15, 2002). 
 47 See pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732 (7th cir. 2004) (inmate 
denied compensatory damages on his claim that he gained 
fifty pounds and suffered depression as a result of  his place-
ment in disciplinary segregation; court held that any physical 
injury was de minimis); Jarriett v. Wilson, 162 F. app’x 394 
(6th cir. 2005) (holding that inmate placed in prison’s  
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Senator thurmond)). See also 141 Cong. reC. 26,449 (1995) 
(statement of  Senator reid) (“[prisoners who] have a merito-
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 65 cohn, supra note 49, at 305. See also nguyen, supra note 63, 
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Senator abraham) (abraham, a proponent of  the plra, 
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nals’ constitutional rights . . .”), and royal v. Kautzky, 375 F. 
3d 720, 729 (8th cir. 2004) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (“there 
is nothing in the legislative history of  § 1997e(e) . . . to sug-
gest that congress’s intent was to prevent legitimate 
constitutional claims simply because the prisoner suffered no 
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 66 Boston, supra note 41, at 435 (“the plra’s mental or emo-
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 67 cohn, supra note 49, at 307–08 n.50 (citing cases).
 68 rhodes v. champman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
 69 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991).
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harv. l. rev. 1145, 1152 (2008).
 80 Wolff  v. Mcdonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974).
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 58 See gigette M. Bejin, The 1995 Legislation for Prisoner Litiga-
tion Reform: Has the Pendulum Swung the Other Way?, 74 u. 
det. merCy l. rev. 557, 558 (1997) (citing a study by the Fed-
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1990s, 5 wm. & mary Bill rts. J. 427, 485 (1997) (reporting 
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418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of  Sen. Kyl)).
 62 royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 730 (8th cir. 2004) (Heaney, 
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